

SAMUEL TERRY
ASSET MANAGEMENT


Samuel Terry Absolute Return Group

April 2026



23 years of good returns

To 31 March 2026	A Class Units (Net)	Founder Class Units (Net)	All Ords Accum Index
1 quarter	1.3%	1.6%	(2.7%)
1 year	15.8%	17.3%	11.3%
3 years (p.a.)	12.7%	13.6%	9.4%
5 years (p.a.)	14.4%	15.6%	8.4%
10 years (p.a.)	<i>n/a</i>	18.9%	9.5%
Since inception (p.a)*	15.7%	16.2%	8.8%



*Founder units used for demonstrative purposes to show the performance of the fund since inception. Both units are issued by the same fund, the difference is the performance fee hurdle. Since 2016, only A units have been offered.



Investment style



“One-way bets”

Heads, I win...
Tails, I don't lose...

Typically > 80% of capital employed



“Irrational odds”

Heads, I win \$5...
Tails, I only lose \$1...

Family Office Approach

Flexible enough to capture obscure opportunities, patient enough to wait for them



Principles that shape our decisions



Flexible

- Not tied to an index
- Invests across structures, markets and geographies
- Willing to be active investors (ideally, we do not have to be)



Conservative

- Typically invests in companies with net cash
- No shorting or leverage within the fund
- Cash weighting has averaged 18%



Uncomplicated

- If we cannot find attractive investments, we wait in cash
- We invest heavily in our best ideas
- Low turnover; long-term owners

Alignment: significant investment from the team



Investing opportunistically

Looking for "empty rooms"



Invest both in Australia and internationally

Listed equities

Unlisted equities

High-yield credit

Distressed credit

Unchanged for the last 23 years

 Listed (Australian) equities account for most of our investments



**We invest where value exists,
across the capital structure.**

**If not ,
we hold cash.**

Aligned team of 8



Fred Woollard
Partner



Nigel Burgess
Partner



Mitch Taylor
Partner



Ouafaa Karim
Chief Operating Officer



Peter van Beek
Investor Relations



Therese Cochrane
General Manager



Charlie Kingston
Senior Analyst



Oliver Coombs
Analyst



Reasons **NOT** to invest | Our fund is not for everyone

1. Lesser-known and hard-to-find securities comprise part of the Fund's portfolio. If you want to invest only in well-known, blue-chip securities, this Fund is not for you
2. The Fund's portfolio is usually risk-averse and defensive, but during market panics it may aggressively buy deeply discounted securities that others are panic-selling. While this strategy has delivered strong returns in past crises (March 2020, 2008-09), some investors may not feel comfortable with this approach
3. At times, a small proportion of the Fund will be invested in speculative securities. Some of these will pay off. Others will become worthless, as some have done
4. The Fund is not suitable for investors seeking a short-term home for their money, since its illiquid holdings may be difficult to sell quickly if the Fund receives many redemption requests at once
5. The Fund has a more concentrated portfolio than most other funds
6. Although performance in recent years has been favourable, the Fund has had periods of poor performance, and will do so again
7. The Fund is unlikely to pay a regular income




Reasons NOT to invest | Our fees are higher than those of many other funds



Management Fee

1.5% p.a.



Performance Fee

20% above the RBA Cash Rate
+ 2% pa, with a high-water mark



Future Opportunities | more special situations

Special situations, where we can deploy hundreds of millions into high conviction investments, have been a large driver of our returns...



Our track record, experience and AUM enables these investments

...we are expecting more distressed credit opportunities in the future

- Elevated interest rates are placing pressure on borrowers and refinancing conditions
- Redemption pressures may drive forced selling across parts of credit markets
- A reduced buyer base may lead to wider spreads and improved pricing



Carnival Corp

Post a dramatic sell off, we'd have happily owned the equity of Carnival – by buying the debt instead, we added a margin of safety to our investment

Investing in a pandemic-hit industry

- Leading global cruise operator (~46% market share) with largely unencumbered assets
- COVID-19 shutdown drove a sharp dislocation across equity and debt markets

Buying ridiculously cheap bonds at an opportune time

- Bought unsecured bonds at a >17% yield to maturity
- Implied valuation of <10% of replacement value (NTA)
- Significant asset backing with conservative leverage (<60% LVR)
- Purchased at 70c in the dollar (May 2020) and exited at 95c within ~6 months (plus coupons)

Heads I win, tails I don't lose

- Our work with travel agents showed customers were taking credits for future travel rather than refunds, supporting demand and near-term liquidity
- If our work was wrong, strong asset backing meant we would own ships at a material discount to replacement value
- In practice, the bonds repriced rapidly as liquidity concerns eased

Delivered an annualised return of 38% buying an asset with significant downside coverage






Namoi Cotton Limited

Acquired shares at a discount during drought, drove strategic changes and positioned the business for a competitive bidding war

Investing in an underperforming business

- ASX-listed; Australia’s largest integrated cotton agribusiness
- Historically a co-operative (ie owned by its customers); converted to a company in 2017 but retained co-op culture

Investment returned 2.1x money



Looking for empty rooms

- Bought 25% of shares during drought and depressed cash-flows
- Acquired at a discount to NTA, replacement value and sustainable earnings

Active business owners; incentives work

- Secured board representation and pressed for management changes
- Management launched a strategic review; led to bidding war by global majors



Yellow Holdings NZ

Bought from a motivated seller. We received multiples of our cost via dividends, then initiated a profitable trade sale

Investing in an underperforming business

- Well known business directory service provider, valued at \$2bn in 2007
- Had been in structural decline for over a decade

Looking for empty rooms

- Bought a profitable business debt-free for the value of its cash in bank
- Irrelevant holding for private equity sellers

Active business owners; incentives work

- "This is a project, not a career"; management were incentivised to deliver cash returns
- Received multiples of our investment in cash distributions
- Post distributions, sold rump for more than our purchase price

Investment returned 3.9x money





One Market Limited

Opportunistic bet where downside case materialised; we still made a small profit

Corporate divestment of a non-core asset

- Technology spin-out from Westfield via in-specie distribution
- For every \$100 in Westfield, holders received < \$1 in OneMarket


Looking for empty rooms

- Most shareholders were motivated sellers of small, misunderstood parcels
- Bought at a fraction of invested capital, and below cash backing

Downside case materialised

- Board and management were high calibre
- When tech failed, they acted rationally; liquidated business, returned cash

We kept buying as the stock traded down at a discount to cash backing and realised a small profit





Fund Summary

Fund Name	Samuel Terry Absolute Return Group (comprising Samuel Terry Absolute Return Fund and Samuel Terry Absolute Return Active Fund)
APIR Code	STP9437AU
Fund inception	November 2003
Fund Size	A\$1,122m
Base Currency	Australian Dollars
Investor eligibility	Wholesale investors only
Fund Liquidity	Monthly redemptions processed at month-end. Net redemptions are subject to 2.5% of NAV per month.
Administrator and Custodian	MUFG (previously known as Link Fund Solutions)
Auditor	Grant Thornton
Management fee	1.5% plus GST p.a
Performance fee	20% of benchmark outperformance, with a high-water mark
Benchmark	RBA cash rate plus 2% p.a
Buy/Sell spread	0.5% (retained by the fund to protect ongoing investors. Not received by the Manager)
Platform availability	Powerwrap, Netwealth, Clearstream

The Samuel Terry Story



Samuel Terry, the “Botany Bay Rothschild”, was Australia’s richest person relative to GDP. Arriving as an 18th-century convict, he built his wealth by spotting undervalued opportunities that others overlooked with boldness, discipline and patience. Despite his success, he was never a household name; his story of quiet achievement is what inspires our firm today.

“We buy junk and sell antiques”



Symbolises turning neglect into opportunity

SAMUEL TERRY
ASSET MANAGEMENT



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ASSET MANAGEMENT

Still interested?

Feel free to contact us to hear more

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Disclaimer

Samuel Terry Asset Management Pty Limited (AFSL 278294) does not guarantee the repayment of capital or any particular rate of return from the Fund. Past performance is no guarantee or indication of future performance. The unit price can go down as well as up. Investment returns have been calculated in accordance with normal industry practice utilising movements in the unit price and assuming reinvestment of all distribution of income and realised profits. The presentation does not take into account a reader's investment objectives, particular needs or financial situation. It is general information only and should not be considered as investment advice and should not be relied on as an investment recommendation.

We cannot and are not providing tax advice, and encourage you to seek independent tax advice before investing.